I. INTRODUCTION

M
ULTIMEDIA data can be easily copied, reproduced and sometimes maliciously processed in a networked environment. Thus, protection of multimedia information has attracted a lot of attention during the last few years. Watermarking has been proposed as an efficient tool for copyright protection. The related research has exhibited tremendous growth in the past decade. The basic concept behind any watermarking technique is the insertion of an invisible signal (watermark) in the original data. This signal conveys copyright information about the owner or authorized user. A watermark should fulfill some basic requirements. These can be summarized as follows.
• Imperceptibility: Watermark perceptibility not only decreases the media quality, but also easies watermark localization and removal.
• Robustness: The watermark should be detected even after intentional or unintentional processing attacks.
• Noninvertibility: The watermark should be localized within a watermarked signal.
• Media dependency: Although a single key produces a single watermark, a watermark should be signal-dependent to avoid collusion attacks.
• Trustworthy detection: False alarm and false rejection probabilities should be sufficiently low. A general watermarking framework for copyright protection has been presented in [1] , [2] and describes all these issues in detail. Watermarking has recently become a very active research area and numerous methods dealing with audio [3] , image [4] - [9] or video watermarking [10] - [14] have appeared in the literature to date. Overview papers on existing multimedia watermarking methods can be found in [15] , [16] . The limited existing literature, with respect to 3-D volumetric data watermarking, manifests the little attention that has been given to this domain, which is very important particularly for medical image copyright protection. Both spatial and transform domain techniques have been proposed for 3-D volume watermarking. In [17] , a 3-D voxel based watermarking method is proposed, which is an extension of the 2-D watermarking methods [6] , [18] . In [19] , a 3-D voxel based watermarking method is proposed. The watermark is embedded into the 3-D DCT domain of the volume and then, the watermarked volume is obtained by applying an inverse DCT. This method is robust against geometric attacks but it is not blind since the original volume is subtracted from the watermarked one. A similar approach is presented in [20] . In this case, the embedding is performed in the wavelet domain.
Volumetric watermarking can be performed using two categories of watermarking techniques. The first one includes slicebased techniques, which are similar to the classical 2-D watermarking methods. The main idea behind this group of techniques is that the watermark is embedded separately into each 2-D slice. The second category of watermarking techniques consists of volume-based ones. The major difference of the latter group of techniques is that they treat the volume as a 3-D signal instead of a set of 2-D signals (slices). In attempting a brief comparison between the two different categories, one can argue that slice-based techniques are simpler, faster and less computationally intensive. On the other hand, slice-based techniques can not cope with 3-D geometrical attacks that do not have an equivalent 2-D attack. For example, if is the axis that is perpendicular to the slices, then 3-D rotation around this axis is equivalent to 2-D rotations of all slices around the intersection point of the axis and each slice. Any other type of 3-D rotation does not have an equivalent set of 2-D slice rotations resulting in watermark detection failure. 3-D rotation, as well as 3-D scaling, changes the number of the volume slices. Thus, these attacks can not be handled by slice-based techniques. Volume-based techniques, can cope more efficiently with the above mentioned 3-D attacks, although being more computationally complex.
Generally, there are many ways in the literature that the researchers cope with the watermark robustness against geometric attacks issue. One way is the use of a pattern (or template) in the watermark construction. Thus, due to the existence of redundant information the issue of watermark resynchronization becomes much easier. Such examples can be found in [21] - [24] . Another way is the use of a geometric invariant domain such as the Fourier-mellin and Radon transform, the Fourier magnitude and the Zernike moments. Most of these ideas where inspired from image registration methods. These watermarking methods can be found in [25] - [28] . Finally, another approach is the geometric attack estimation through embedded features. The main idea is the feature embedding in order to be able to detect them even after a geometric attack. After the successful features detection, it is easy to estimate the geometric attacks performed to the watermark media, invert the geometric transformation and then detect the watermark. Unfortunately, the main drawback of these approach is that these features can be detected also for an attacker and then eliminated. Furthermore, the attacks can add some other features in order to confuse the detector regarding the embedded features. In [29] - [31] , watermarking feature based approaches can be found.
In this paper, a volumetric data watermarking method for 3-D volumes is presented. The watermark is embedded in the magnitude of the Fourier transform of the volume. The watermark is not embedded on the entire frequency domain, but it is located between two homocentric spheres. This watermarking method is blind, which implies that the original (unwatermarked) volume is not needed in the detection procedure. Therefore, if the volume is geometrically transformed (rotated, translated, scaled or cropped), the detection procedure is relatively slow. However, the special watermark structure and the fact that the watermark is embedded in the Fourier magnitude accelerates the detection procedure, because the geometrical properties of the Fourier domain are exploited. More specifically, the watermark is designed in such a way as to obtain icosahedral symmetry. This property, as it will be seen later on, accelerates the detection procedure significantly, in the case that the watermarked volume has been rotated. Thus, this method could be associated in both pattern watermarking methods as well as to the geometric invariant ones.
A corresponding symmetry in the 2-D (image) watermarking case could be exploited if a ring consisting of identical sectors was chosen as the embedded watermark. In such a case, the rotation search space would decrease from rad to , where denotes the number of the identical sectors [32] .
However, in the 3-D (volume) watermarking case, the fact that there exist three rotation angles increases the search space significantly and poses a challenge, in the sense that the watermark is selected to exploit symmetries to minimize the search space. One way to tackle this problem would be to extend the aforementioned 2-D watermarking symmetry case, selecting a spherical shell as a watermark and exploiting the icosahedral symmetry in the watermark values.
The 3-D volume watermarking differs significantly from the watermarking of 1-D or 2-D signals. For example in audio watermarking there is no rotation attack and translation attack is simpler since that the signal can be translated only to one dimension. In the 2-D watermarking, translation can be performed in two dimensions and also rotation attack is an applicable attack. Finally, in the 3-D case the attacks depend on the application. For example, in video watermarking rotation attack can not be applied in video data along the time axis. Scaling may be applied but frame size (scaling in the -axis) and frame rate (scaling in the -axis) may be assumed known before the embedding and detection procedures. On the other hand in 3-D volume watermarking 3-D rotation, 3-D translation and scaling are much more rich since they are defined on a 7 parameter space.
Thus, if we had applied a 2-D watermarking method in a 3-D volume (by embedding 2-D different watermarks in each volume slice) then this method would not be robust against scaling and rotation. In the case of scaling, the number of slices would be changed (according to the scale factor) and we could not detect the watermarks since that the number of slices will be different than the number of the embedded watermarks.
In the rotation case, only if the rotation performed around -axis, the 2-D watermarks would be robust, since rotation around -axis would result in 2-D rotation of each volume slice. If the rotation would performed around other axis different than the one, then the 2-D rotation would not be robust.
The paper is organized as follows. The properties of the 3-D Fourier transform are described in Section II. Then, watermark construction is outlined in Section III. In the next two Sections IV and V, the watermark embedding and detection procedures are illustrated. In Section VI, special reference is given to the robustness of the method against geometrical distortions and to the contribution of the watermark structure and the properties of Fourier transform towards that goal. In Section VII, experimental results are presented. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VIII.
II. 3-D FOURIER TRANSFORM PROPERTIES
In this section the important Fourier transform properties will be presented that will be exploited in the watermark embedding and detection procedure. Let be a grayscale original volume. Its Discrete Fourier Transform is given by (1) , shown at the bottom of the page. Let also be the magnitude of . The 3-D Fourier transform has the following properties:
• Circular shifts in the spatial domain do not effect the magnitude of the Fourier transform:
• Scaling in the spatial domain causes inverse scaling in the frequency domain:
where is the scaling factor.
(1) • Rotation in the spatial domain causes the same rotation in the frequency domain:
(4) where denotes the transpose operator and is the 3-D rotation matrix by , and angles around , and axes respectively.
III. WATERMARK CONSTRUCTION
The watermark is a 3-D bivalued 1, signal. The number of has to be identical to the number of , so that the watermark signal has a zero mean value. To proceed, one should observe that modifications in the low frequencies of the Fourier transform will cause visible changes in the spatial domain of the 3-D volume. Furthermore, usual lowpass filtering operations mostly affects the high frequencies of the Fourier transform. Thus, the watermark should be added in the middle frequencies, because, if carefully designed, it will be both robust against lowpass filtering and perceptually invisible. Considering that the zero frequency term is in the center of the transform domain, the watermark is embedded in a region that covers the middle frequencies: if and if (5) where , ,
The watermark is a spherical shell of inner radius and outer radius , having values . Another important issue, besides the determination of its embedding domain, is 3-D watermark symmetry. We construct a symmetrical watermark in order to reduce the search space in the rotation domain . This symmetrical watermark support region is selected to be a regular polyhedron. Obviously, as the number of the polyhedron edges increases, the rotation search space decreases. Although in the corresponding 2-D method, a 2-D ring divided into any desirable number of sectors is required [32] , in the 3-D case the number of the polyhedron faces can not be arbitrary. Unfortunately, there is an upper limit for the number of the edges of a regular polyhedron [33] . This polyhedron is the icosahedron and it is illustrated in Fig. 1 . It can be considered as a union of 20 pyramids where each individual pair of pyramids have a common face. The coordinates of the 12 icosahedron vertices can be given by , , , where is the golden ratio ( ) ( [33, proposition 16] ). Thus, the watermark shell can be considered as an inner sphere of an icosahedron, which consists of identical pyramids. The use of icosahedral symmetries in fast watermark detection is analyzed in Section VI.
IV. WATERMARK EMBEDDING
Let be the phase of the Fourier transform of the volume and the watermark. The watermark is embedded in the volume Fourier magnitude coefficients, according to the following embedding rule: (6) where is a factor that determines the watermark strength. The embedding has been performed in a multiplicative way, because this corresponds to a simple watermark masking i.e., the watermark amplitude increases as the Fourier coefficient magnitude increase. It is obvious that, due to the fact that represents the Fourier magnitude, its values should be positive. Therefore, should be selected to be smaller than 1. The watermarked volume is produced by taking the inverse Fourier transform of the watermarked magnitude and the phase of the original volume :
V. WATERMARK DETECTION AND METHOD EVALUATION
A. Watermark Detection
Let be a possibly watermarked volume and its DFT magnitude. The correlation between the possibly watermarked coefficients and the watermark can be used to detect the presence of the watermark:
If the volume is watermarked by another watermark , , then the correlation is given by (9) , shown at the bottom of the next page. If the volume is watermarked by , the correlation is shown in (10) 
The mean value of the normalized correlator is expected to be 1 for every watermarked volume, when calculated for the correct watermark . Most often, the watermarks that are produced by random generators do not have a zero mean value. Thus, the correlator should be modified in order to avoid this problem. The modified correlator is of the form:
where , , and , are the cardinalities of and respectively. We assume that Practically, we calculate two sums, the sum of the where the corresponding watermark values equal 1 and the sum of the where the corresponding watermark values equal . The quantity in the brackets is the weighted difference between the first and the second sum. Then, this is divided by the quantity in the last fraction in order to achive unity mean.
B. Performance Evaluation of the Watermarking Method
For the performance evaluation of the proposed method, false alarm and false rejection probabilities will be used. The watermark detection rule could be is watermarked by , if ;
is not watermarked by , if .
Considering that is the detection threshold, two error probabilities must be estimated, namely the false alarm probability (which is the probability of detecting a watermark in an unwatermarked volume) and the false rejection probability , i.e., the probability of not detecting the watermark in the watermarked volume.
In order to estimate these error probabilities ( and ), a watermark is embedded in the volume and then, detection is performed using firstly the correct key (the key that was used in the embedding) and then an erroneous key. This is performed for different pairs of correct and erroneous keys. As a result, two sets of detector outputs are produced, one for the detection with the erroneous key (set ) and one for detection with the correct key (set ). The next step is to calculate the detection errors by counting the detector values of set which are higher than threshold , denoted by and the detector values of set that are lower than , denoted by . The estimates of the probabilities of the detection errors for a particular threshold are given by and . Unfortunately, this performance estimation can produce errors of order of . If the desired order is , we have to perform the above experiments for keys. For large values, the number of the experiments is not feasible. Thus, in order to estimate the above mentioned probability errors, we approximate the empirical pdf of with a continuous distribution. Assuming that the the detector summation terms in (8) are independent and using the central limit theorem, it can be derived that both detector output sets follow the Gaussian distribution. Then, given the estimated detector output pdfs, the resulting Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves are constructed. The ROC curve is the graphical plot of the false (9) (10) 
VI. GEOMETRICAL ATTACKS
In this section, the attacks of geometrical distortions to the embedded watermark will be examined and recovery mechanisms will be presented. The spherical symmetry will be employed to counter 3-D rotation attacks.
A. Rotation
The watermark is constructed in such way that the detection procedure of a rotated watermarked volume becomes simpler and faster. The main idea is to restrict the search space and, consequently, to make the watermark detection process faster.
Suppose that we have a watermarked volume, rotated by angles , and around , and axes, respectively. Before we perform the detection procedure, we should rotate the watermarked volume backwards to its initial position. However, since the method is blind, the initial unwatermarked volume is unknown. Consequently, the rotation angles are unknown as well. Because of the icosahedral symmetry of the watermark, the detection will be successful not only for the initial position of the watermarked volume but for a total of 20 different rotated positions.
However, the aforementioned symmetry is not adequate. All pyramids of the icosahedron are identical and are filled with randomly generated voxels. The pyramid bases (faces of the icosahedron) are denoted by capital letters. Fig. 2(a) depicts the initial position of the watermark. For illustration purposes, arrows indicate the orientation of the pyramid. Suppose that we rotate the initial watermark in such a way that the resulting watermark domain is the one depicted in Fig. 2(b) . Due to the rotation, faces E,B,A,F of the icosahedron in Fig. 2(a) correspond to faces D,G,C,A, respectively, in Fig. 2(b) .
Even though the faces can be matched using appropriate rotation, the orientation of the corresponding pyramids is not the same. This implies that an additional symmetry issues should be exploited to cope with this problem. More specifically, each pyramid is divided into three identical pyramidal elements as shown in Fig. 3 . Each pyramidal element is symmetrical to the line connecting the center of the mass of the 'mother' pyramid to the three vertices of the base and the center of the icosahedron. Thus, the above mentioned matching can be applied, with the resulting orientation of the corresponding pyramids becoming the same.
Suppose that we wish to search for the point , where is the metacenter of the shaded face in Fig. 1 . Let, , be the metacenter of the rest of the icosahedron faces. Because of the symmetry, it is adequate to match with any of the points , . In the shaded area, there exists exactly one . Thus, we can limit out search in this area. If the watermark is appropriately rotated so that point is matched with any of , then, only the symmetric point of with respect to , is also matched, where is the center of the icosahedron. However, the rest of the points should be matched as well. This could only be performed by rotating the watermark around the axis. Because of the symmetry of each pyramid of the icosahedron, the rotation should not be performed in the interval , but in the interval . Thus, in order to find out the best matching, we correlate (in the Fourier domain) the volume with the rotated watermark for all the rotated versions according the the previous analysis. When we get the maximum correlation value, we assume that the watermark is matched with the volume. It should be noted that the aforementioned procedure is iterative: each step involves rotation in order to match the point followed by rotation around the axis (in the interval ) in order to match the rest points. This procedure is mandatory, since watermark matching can not be determined only by matching, but can be verified only if all the voxels are matched.
Therefore, if we want to detect a rotated volume, it is sufficient to detect any rotations that occur around the axis for angles lying in the interval , and around the axis for angles lying in the interval rad. This is illustrated more clearly in Fig. 4 . In this Figure, the surface of the watermark sphere is shown. Rotation around and axes corresponds to translation of the surface in Fig. 4 . Thus, in order to match a point with any of the points , , we have to rotate only in the above-mentioned intervals. Following that, we should detect rotations around the axis for angles between 0 and , due to the pyramid symmetry. For more advanced detection, each pyramid is divided in sectors as can be seen in Fig. 5 . Hence, as far as the rotation around the axis is concerned, the watermark can be detected not only for the correct angle , but also for angles lying in the interval . depends on the sector dimensions of the pyramids.
1) Special Case: Rotation Around
Axis: In medical imaging applications the most usual rotation that is applied is the rotation around axis. In the case of a nonsymmetrical watermark the search space would be the interval . However, in our case, because of the symmetry, the search space around axis is limited to the , that is the one fifth of the search space in the nonsymmetrical case. This significant search space reduction minimizes the detection time.
B. Scaling
Scaling in the spatial domain causes inverse scaling in the frequency domain (3) . Suppose that the size of the initial volume is and the radii (internal and external) of the watermark (in the frequency domain) are and respectively. Suppose that we scale the watermarked volume by a scale factor , ( ). Then, the scaled volume size is , but the size of the watermark of the scaled volume remains unaltered in the frequency domain. This means that the watermarked coefficients will still lie within the spherical shell of radii and . Thus, in the case of a scaled volume watermark detection, we only have to calculate the correlation between the watermark and the watermarked volume magnitude, since and are absolute values. Furthermore, because of the normalization, the correlation output does not depend on the scale factor . 
C. Cropping
Cropping in the spatial domain results in a change in the frequency sampling step. Thus, in order to detect the watermark, we firstly have to change the frequency sampling step of the cropped volume and then compute the correlation. Unfortunately, since the method is blind, the size of the original (noncropped) volume is not known. Therefore, correlation has to be computed for several sampling steps and the maximum correlator output should be selected.
D. Translation
In the medical imaging domain, all the useful information lies within the volume objects. Usually, the volume background consists of voxels of uniform luminance (typically around zero). Thus, any translation of the volume content that does not lead to object truncation is equivalent to a 3-D circular shift. The proposed method is robust against this kind of attack. Due to the translation property of the Fourier transform, as illustrated in (2), the Fourier magnitude remains unaltered, if a circular shift in the spatial domain has been performed. Rotation around an arbitrary center is equivalent to rotation around the volume center, followed by translation. Therefore, the proposed method is robust to such an attack.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This method has been applied in a number of 3-D medical volumes. A gray scale 256 256 256 volume coming from the Visible Human Project [34] was used as a host volume in this paper [ Fig. 6(a) ]. The number of the nonzero voxels of this volume is equal to 4.671.878, that is only the 27.85% of the total number of the volume voxels. The watermark is finally embedded onto the nonzero voxels only. Thus, after the embedding procedure, all the voxels of the watermarked volume will be converted to zero valued voxels if the corresponding original voxels in the original volume are zero. Of course, this corresponds to a form of arbitrary region cropping.
In Fig. 6(b) , the watermarked volume is presented. The embedding power that was used was equal to 0.3. The parameters and that were used are equal to 26 and 102 respectively. For better visual comparison of the original and the watermarked volumes, the same (namely the 133th) frame of each volume is presented in Fig. 7(a) and (b) respectively. There is no visible difference between the two frames. The absolute difference between the original and the watermarked frame is shown in Fig. 8 . Note in order the differences to be visible the absolute difference has been multiplied by 20. The SNR of the watermarked volume is 31 dB. Therefore, the watermark is expected to be invisible. In Fig. 8 , the absolute difference between the original and watermarked frames. Since that the difference is small, the resulted frame would appear totally black. Thus, we multiplied it by the factor 20 in order to make visible the differences between the original and the watermarked frames. In Fig. 9 another example of originalwatermarked volume pair is shown and in Fig. 11 the ROC curve for this volume is illustrated.
The robustness of the 3-D watermarking system to various attacks is shown in Figs. 10-17 , where we plot the detector output pdfs for the two hypothesis , and the resulting ROC (defined in Section V-B). As shown in Figs. 10-17 , in all the performed experiments, is always bigger than the chosen threshold ( ) in case of detection using the correct key, and lower that , when the detection is performed with an erroneous key (even if the volume is distorted, compressed or geometrically transformed). Thus, according to the experimental results, both false alarm and false rejection errors are equal to zero ( ). In order to estimate the above errors more accurately, we will follow the procedure mentioned in the end of Section V-B. For that reason, the errors that are presented in the next paragraphs are very small, even though the number of experiments can not justify so large accuracy.
In Fig. 10 , the ROC curve of the detector output is shown in the case of no attack. The two empirical pdfs are very well separated and the EER is very small ( ). In the next two Figs. 12 and 13, ROC curves of the detector output are shown in the cases of median and moving average filtering respectively. The window size in the filtering processes is 3 3 3. The robustness is very good and the EER is and for the median and moving average filtering respectively. In Fig. 14 , the ROC curve of the detector output on the histogram equalized volume is presented. In this case, the results are even better compared with the no attack case (Fig. 10 ). This happens because histogram equalization amplifies middle frequency noise, and therefore, the watermark itself. According to this observation, we can apply histogram equalization or high-pass filtering or an image whitening operation as a pre-detection process, in order to improve the detection results, i.e., to decrease the false alarm and false rejection errors.
In Fig. 15 , the ROC curve in the case of a translation attack is illustrated. The volume has been translated by five voxels in the -axis, 10 voxels in the -axis and 15 voxels in the -axis. The EER in this case equals . In Fig. 16(a)-(b) the watermarking method robustness against JPEG compression is examined. This is a 2-D attack that is performed separately in every frame. The quality of the compressed images is rather low and equals 60. The method performance is very good since the EER is . In Fig. 17 , the ROC curve in the case of a scaling attack is illustrated. The scale factors are equal to 0.5. Because of scaling, the high frequencies of the volume are attenuated. Generally, the frequencies that will be deleted depend on the downsampling factor. Hence, the bigger the downsampling factor is, the bigger the number of the high frequencies that will be deleted is. Despite this fact, robustness is good with . Apart from the isotropic scaling, we have performed nonisotroping scaling. In Fig. 18 , the detector output for anisotropic scaling attack is shown. In this case, we performed scaling only along and axis. More specifically, we used scaling factors , , for to 1.035. Although that the method is not robust against anisotropic scaling, the watermark can be detected for small scaling factors ( ). In the Fig. 19(a)-(b) , the watermarked volume output in the case of a combined geometric attack is presented. More specifically, the watermarked volume has been scaled from size 256 256 256 to 307 307 307 (scaling factor 1.199). Then, the scaled volume has been cropped to the size 256 256 256. As it is illustrated in these Figures, the resulting volume has been scaled and cropped (the lower part of the face, the neck and the shoulders as well as the nose have been cropped). The detection has been performed according to the procedure described in Section VI-C. Thus, we have to detect the watermark for several sampling steps and then select the highest value of the correlator. An example is shown in the Fig. 19(c) . Due to the fact that the highest value of the detector is selected to be the max value of correlator outputs for the several sampling steps, the distribution mean of the correlator output in the case of erroneous watermark detection is slightly bigger than zero. It should be noted that, in this case, a full watermark search would be very complicated computationally, if it would require detection for several scaling factors as well as for translations in , and axis. Using the proposed method, the search has to be limited only to the different sampling steps. In the Fig. 20(a) , the ROC curve is shown. Although the errors are slightly bigger than in the no attack case due to the errors imported by the attacks (interpolation by scaling attack and deduction of watermark energy by cropping), the detection performance is still very good ( ). Finally, the results with respect to a rotation attack are presented in Fig. 21(a) . More specifically, the watermarked volume is rotated using suitable angles, so that, due to the watermark symmetry, the detector output will be expected to be above the threshold. This experiment has been performed for all the combinations of the following angles: 0, , , , around the -axis, 0, , , , around the -axis and 0, , around the axis. As depicted in Fig. 21(a) , for all the above angles the produced detector output shows that the watermark (due to symmetry) remains unaltered.
In order to show the method sensitivity on the search step size we performed the following experiment. We performed detections by rotating the watermark using small rotation angles. The results are shown in Fig. 21(b) . It can be seen that the method it quite robust against rotation. The watermark symmetry accelerates the watermark detection but, at the same time, it reduces the watermark capacity. One way to estimate the watermark capacity is to calculate the false alarm errors. The false alarm errors come from the existence of similar watermarks in watermark set. If the capacity is big enough, then the false alarm errors are small. Thus, according to the experimental results presented in this section, due to the fact that the false alarm errors are very small we conclude that the watermark capacity is satisfactory.
A. Complexity
It is obvious that in the case that the watermarked volume has not undergone geometrical attacks, the watermark is synchronized with the watermarked volume. Thus, the only operation needed is the calculation of the Fourier magnitude of the watermarked volume and then the correlation between the watermarked magnitude and the watermark. The same stands also in the case of translation since that translation does not affect the Fourier magnitude. In the case of scaling attack, again no further operations are needed. Of course, if the scaling factor is greater than one, then just a part of the watermarked magnitude will be correlated with the watermark. If the scaling factor is lower than one, then a part of the watermark has to be correlated with the watermarked magnitude. In the case of cropping, the search has to be performed for several sampling steps (Fig. 19(c) ). Finally, in the case of rotation, the procedure is presented in Section VI-A. The watermark is matched, if the point of the watermark is matched with one of the points of the watermarked signal, and subsequently, if the rest of the points are matched. In order to match the point , we have to search for all the combinations of rotations that moves the point inside a spherical triangle (Fig. 4) . Then, in order to match the rest of the points we have to rotate the watermark around the axis in the interval . Thus, the total number of searches (correlations), for the rotation case, equals the product of the rotations for the matching of the point times the rotations for the matching of the rest of the points. The number of the rotations depends on the incremental step of the rotation angle. Each watermark pyramid can be constructed in such a way as to increase the incremental step and consequently decrease the number of rotations and the detection time. For example, the pyramid in Fig. 5 is constructed in such a way that the rotations around the axis can be done using a quite large incremental search (3 degrees), because the pyramid is highly correlated with its rotated versions around axis for small angles. Furthermore, the pyramid in this Figure is constructed in a such a way that decreases the incremental search for the cropping searches. In Fig. 19(c) , we achieve high correlator values for two sampling steps that allows us to double the sampling step and consequently decrease the number of searches.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a blind watermarking method for 3-D volumes is presented. In order to decrease the detection time, a symmetrical watermark is constructed. The embedding-detection procedures are performed in the Fourier domain of the volume and more specifically, in the Fourier magnitude. By inserting the watermark in the Fourier magnitude, the frequencies that are watermarked can be easily determined, resulting in robustness against filtering attacks and compression. Furthermore, due to the Fourier magnitude properties, the method is also robust against geometrical distortions. The spherical symmetry of the embedded watermark is used to reduce the search space after rotation attacks.
